Package Instance

Supplementary groups are not set up properly in github.com/containerd/containerd
### Impact

A bug was found in containerd where supplementary groups are not set up properly inside a container.  If an attacker has direct access to a container and manipulates their supplementary group access, they may be able to use supplementary group access to bypass primary group restrictions in some cases, potentially gaining access to sensitive information or gaining the ability to execute code in that container.

Downstream applications that use the containerd client library may be affected as well.

### Patches
This bug has been fixed in containerd v1.6.18 and v.1.5.18.  Users should update to these versions and recreate containers to resolve this issue.  Users who rely on a downstream application that uses containerd's client library should check that application for a separate advisory and instructions.

### Workarounds

Ensure that the `"USER $USERNAME"` Dockerfile instruction is not used.  Instead, set the container entrypoint to a value similar to `ENTRYPOINT ["su", "-", "user"]` to allow `su` to properly set up supplementary groups.

### References

- https://www.benthamsgaze.org/2022/08/22/vulnerability-in-linux-containers-investigation-and-mitigation/
- Docker/Moby: CVE-2022-36109, fixed in Docker 20.10.18
- CRI-O: CVE-2022-2995, fixed in CRI-O 1.25.0
- Podman: CVE-2022-2989, fixed in Podman 3.0.1 and 4.2.0
- Buildah: CVE-2022-2990, fixed in Buildah 1.27.1

Note that CVE IDs apply to a particular implementation, even if an issue is common.

### For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

* Open an issue in [containerd](https://github.com/containerd/containerd/issues/new/choose)
* Email us at [security@containerd.io](mailto:security@containerd.io)

To report a security issue in containerd:
* [Report a new vulnerability](https://github.com/containerd/containerd/security/advisories/new)
* Email us at [security@containerd.io](mailto:security@containerd.io)

containerd allows host filesystem access on pull
### Impact

A time-of-check to time-of-use (TOCTOU) vulnerability was found in containerd v2.1.0. While unpacking an image during an image pull, specially crafted container images could arbitrarily modify the host file system. 

### Patches
This bug has been fixed in the following containerd versions:

* 2.1.1

The only affected version of containerd is 2.1.0.  Other versions of containerd are not affected.

Users should update to this version to resolve the issue.

### Workarounds
Ensure that only trusted images are used and that only trusted users have permissions to import images.

### Credits
The containerd project would like to thank Tõnis Tiigi for responsibly disclosing this issue in accordance with the [containerd security policy](https://github.com/containerd/project/blob/main/SECURITY.md).

### References
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-47290

### For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

* Open an issue in [containerd](https://github.com/containerd/containerd/issues/new/choose)
* Email us at [security@containerd.io](mailto:security@containerd.io)

To report a security issue in containerd:

* [Report a new vulnerability](https://github.com/containerd/containerd/security/advisories/new)
* Email us at [security@containerd.io](mailto:security@containerd.io)

Multiple vulnerabilities have been found in containerd, the worst
    of which could result in privilege escalation.

Moby (Docker Engine) started with non-empty inheritable Linux process capabilities
### Impact

A bug was found in Moby (Docker Engine) where containers were incorrectly started with non-empty inheritable Linux process capabilities, creating an atypical Linux environment and enabling programs with inheritable file capabilities to elevate those capabilities to the permitted set during `execve(2)`.  Normally, when executable programs have specified permitted file capabilities, otherwise unprivileged users and processes can execute those programs and gain the specified file capabilities up to the bounding set.  Due to this bug, containers which included executable programs with inheritable file capabilities allowed otherwise unprivileged users and processes to additionally gain these inheritable file capabilities up to the container's bounding set.  Containers which use Linux users and groups to perform privilege separation inside the container are most directly impacted.

This bug did not affect the container security sandbox as the inheritable set never contained more capabilities than were included in the container's bounding set.


### Patches

This bug has been fixed in Moby (Docker Engine) 20.10.14.  Users should update to this version as soon as possible.  Running containers should be stopped, deleted, and recreated for the inheritable capabilities to be reset.

This fix changes Moby (Docker Engine) behavior such that containers are started with a more typical Linux environment.  Refer to `capabilities(7)` for a description of how capabilities work.  Note that permitted file capabilities continue to allow for privileges to be raised up to the container's bounding set and that processes may add capabilities to their own inheritable set up to the container's bounding set per the rules described in the manual page.  In all cases the container's bounding set provides an upper bound on the capabilities that can be assumed and provides for the container security sandbox.

### Workarounds

The entrypoint of a container can be modified to use a utility like `capsh(1)` to drop inheritable capabilities prior to the primary process starting.

### Credits

The Moby project would like to thank [Andrew G. Morgan](https://github.com/AndrewGMorgan) for responsibly disclosing this issue in accordance with the [Moby security policy](https://github.com/moby/moby/blob/master/SECURITY.md).

### For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

* [Open an issue](https://github.com/moby/moby/issues/new)
* Email us at [security@docker.com](mailto:security@docker.com) if you think you’ve found a security bug