Package Instance

MantisBT is vulnerable to authentication bypass through the SOAP API on MySQL
Mantis Bug Tracker instances running on MySQL and compatible databases are affected by an authentication bypass vulnerability in the SOAP API, as a result of improper type checking on the password parameter.

Other database backends are not affected, as they do not perform implicit type conversion from string to integer.

### Impact
Using a crafted SOAP envelope, an attacker knowing the victim's username is able to login to the SOAP API with their account without knowledge of the actual password, and execute any API function they have access to.

### Patches
* b349e5c890eeda9bd82e7c7e14479853f8a30d9f

### Workarounds
- [Disabling the SOAP API](https://mantisbt.org/docs/master/en-US/Admin_Guide/html-desktop/#admin.config.api.disable) significantly reduces the risk, but still allows the attacker to retrieve user account information including email address and real name.

### Resources
- https://mantisbt.org/bugs/view.php?id=36902

### Credits
MantisBT thanks Alexander Philiotis of SynerComm for discovering and responsibly reporting the issue.

MantisBT lacks verification when changing a user's email address
When a user edits their profile to change their e-mail address, the system saves it without validating that it actually belongs to the user.

MantisBT Vulnerable to Denial-of-Service (DoS) via Excessive Note Length
A lack of server-side validation for note length in MantisBT allows attackers to permanently corrupt issue activity logs by submitting extremely long notes (tested with 4,788,761 characters). Once such a note is added:

MantisBT vulnerable to authentication bypass for some passwords due to PHP type juggling
Due to an incorrect use of loose (`==`) instead of strict (`===`) comparison in the [authentication code][1], PHP type juggling will cause interpretation of certain MD5 hashes as numbers, specifically those matching scientific notation.

[1]: https://github.com/mantisbt/mantisbt/blob/0fb502dd613991e892ed2224ac5ea3e40ba632bc/core/authentication_api.php#L782

MantisBT unauthorized disclosure of private project column configuration
Due to insufficient access-level checks, any non-admin user having access to _manage_config_columns_page.php_ (typically project managers having MANAGER role) can use the _Copy From_ action to retrieve the columns configuration from a private project they have no access to.

Access to the reverse operation (_Copy To_) is correctly controlled, i.e. it is not possible to alter the private project's configuration.