Package Instance

Git LFS may write to arbitrary files via crafted symlinks
### Impact

When populating a Git repository's working tree with the contents of Git LFS objects, certain Git LFS commands may write to files visible outside the current Git working tree if symbolic or hard links exist which collide with the paths of files tracked by Git LFS.

Git LFS has resolved this problem by revising the `git lfs checkout` and `git lfs pull` commands so that they check for symbolic links in the same manner as performed by Git before writing to files in the working tree.  These commands now also remove existing files in the working tree before writing new files in their place.

As well, Git LFS has resolved a problem whereby the `git lfs checkout` and `git lfs pull` commands, when run in a bare repository, could write to files visible outside the repository.  While a specific and relatively unlikely set of conditions were required for this to occur, it is no longer possible under any circumstances.

### Patches

This problem exists in all versions since 0.5.2 and is patched in v3.7.1.  All users should upgrade to v3.7.1.

### Workarounds

Support for symlinks in Git may be disabled by setting the `core.symlinks` configuration option to `false`, after which further clones and fetches will not create symbolic links.  However, any symbolic or hard links in existing repositories will still provide the opportunity for Git LFS to write to their targets.

### References

- https://github.com/git-lfs/git-lfs/security/advisories/GHSA-6pvw-g552-53c5
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-26625
- https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-26625
- https://github.com/git-lfs/git-lfs/releases/tag/v3.7.1
- [git-lfs/git-lfs@5c11ffce9a](https://github.com/git-lfs/git-lfs/commit/5c11ffce9a4f095ff356bc781e2a031abb46c1a8)
- [git-lfs/git-lfs@0cffe93176](https://github.com/git-lfs/git-lfs/commit/0cffe93176b870055c9dadbb3cc9a4a440e98396)
- [git-lfs/git-lfs@d02bd13f02](https://github.com/git-lfs/git-lfs/commit/d02bd13f02ef76f6807581cd6b34709069cb3615)

### For more information

If there are any questions or comments about this advisory:
* For general questions, start a discussion in the Git LFS [discussion forum](https://github.com/git-lfs/git-lfs/discussions).
* For reports of additional vulnerabilities, please follow the Git LFS [security reporting policy](https://github.com/git-lfs/git-lfs/blob/main/SECURITY.md).

Git LFS can execute a Git binary from the current directory
### Impact
On Windows, if Git LFS operates on a malicious repository with a `git.bat` or `git.exe` file in the current directory, that program would be executed, permitting the attacker to execute arbitrary code.  This does not affect Unix systems.

This occurs because on Windows, Go includes (and prefers) the current directory when the name of a command run does not contain a directory separator.

### Patches
This version should be patched in v2.12.1, which will be released in coordination with this security advisory.

### Workarounds
Other than avoiding untrusted repositories, there is no workaround.

### For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
* Start a discussion in [the Git LFS discussion page](https://github.com/git-lfs/git-lfs/discussions).
* If you cannot open a discussion, please email the core team using their usernames at `github.com`.

Git LFS permits exfiltration of credentials via crafted HTTP URLs
### Impact

When Git LFS requests credentials from Git for a remote host, it passes portions of the host's URL to the `git-credential(1)` command without checking for embedded line-ending control characters, and then sends any credentials it receives back from the Git credential helper to the remote host.  By inserting URL-encoded control characters such as line feed (LF) or carriage return (CR) characters into the URL, an attacker may be able to retrieve a user's Git credentials.

### Patches

This problem exists in all previous versions and is patched in v3.6.1.  All users should upgrade to v3.6.1.

### Workarounds

There are no workarounds known at this time.

### References

* https://github.com/git-lfs/git-lfs/security/advisories/GHSA-q6r2-x2cc-vrp7
* https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-53263
* https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2024-53263
* https://github.com/git-lfs/git-lfs/releases/tag/v3.6.1
* [git-lfs/git-lfs@0345b6f816](https://github.com/git-lfs/git-lfs/commit/0345b6f816e611d050c0df67b61f0022916a1c90)

### For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
* For general questions, start a discussion in the Git LFS [discussion forum](https://github.com/git-lfs/git-lfs/discussions).
* For reports of additional vulnerabilities, please follow the Git LFS [security reporting policy](https://github.com/git-lfs/git-lfs/blob/main/SECURITY.md).

GitHub Git LFS Arbitrary command execution vulnerability
GitHub Git LFS before 2.1.1 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands via an ssh URL with an initial dash character in the hostname, located on a `url =` line in a `.lfsconfig` file within a repository.
### Specific Go Packages Affected
github.com/git-lfs/git-lfs/lfsapi

Git LFS can execute a Git binary from the current directory on Windows
### Impact
On Windows, if Git LFS operates on a malicious repository with a git.bat or git.exe file in the current directory, that program would be executed, permitting the attacker to execute arbitrary code. This does not affect Unix systems.

This is the result of an incomplete fix for CVE-2020-27955.

This issue occurs because on Windows, [Go includes (and prefers) the current directory when the name of a command run does not contain a directory separator](https://github.com/golang/go/issues/38736).

### Patches
This version should be patched in v2.13.2, which will be released in coordination with this security advisory.

### Workarounds
Other than avoiding untrusted repositories or using a different operating system, there is no workaround.

### References
_Are there any links users can visit to find out more?_

### For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

- Start a discussion in [the Git LFS discussion page](https://github.com/git-lfs/git-lfs/discussions).
- If you cannot open a discussion, please email the core team using their usernames at `github.com`.