Package Instance

jackson-databind possible Denial of Service if using JDK serialization to serialize JsonNode
jackson-databind 2.10.x through 2.12.x before 2.12.6 and 2.13.x before 2.13.1 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (2 GB transient heap usage per read) in uncommon situations involving JsonNode JDK serialization.

snakeYAML before 1.31 vulnerable to Denial of Service due to Out-of-bounds Write
Using snakeYAML to parse untrusted YAML files may be vulnerable to Denial of Service attacks (DOS). If the parser is running on user supplied input, an attacker may supply content that causes the parser to crash by stackoverflow.

snakeYAML before 1.31 vulnerable to Denial of Service due to Out-of-bounds Write
Using snakeYAML to parse untrusted YAML files may be vulnerable to Denial of Service attacks (DOS). If the parser is running on user supplied input, an attacker may supply content that causes the parser to crash by stackoverflow.

SnakeYaml Constructor Deserialization Remote Code Execution
### Summary
SnakeYaml's `Constructor` class, which inherits from `SafeConstructor`, allows
any type be deserialized given the following line:

new Yaml(new Constructor(TestDataClass.class)).load(yamlContent);

Types do not have to match the types of properties in the
target class. A `ConstructorException` is thrown, but only after a malicious
payload is deserialized.

### Severity
High, lack of type checks during deserialization allows remote code execution.

### Proof of Concept
Execute `bash run.sh`. The PoC uses Constructor to deserialize a payload
for RCE. RCE is demonstrated by using a payload which performs a http request to
http://127.0.0.1:8000.

Example output of successful run of proof of concept:

```
$ bash run.sh

[+] Downloading snakeyaml if needed
[+] Starting mock HTTP server on 127.0.0.1:8000 to demonstrate RCE
nc: no process found
[+] Compiling and running Proof of Concept, which a payload that sends a HTTP request to mock web server.
[+] An exception is expected.
Exception:
Cannot create property=payload for JavaBean=Main$TestDataClass@3cbbc1e0
 in 'string', line 1, column 1:
    payload: !!javax.script.ScriptEn ... 
    ^
Can not set java.lang.String field Main$TestDataClass.payload to javax.script.ScriptEngineManager
 in 'string', line 1, column 10:
    payload: !!javax.script.ScriptEngineManag ... 
             ^

	at org.yaml.snakeyaml.constructor.Constructor$ConstructMapping.constructJavaBean2ndStep(Constructor.java:291)
	at org.yaml.snakeyaml.constructor.Constructor$ConstructMapping.construct(Constructor.java:172)
	at org.yaml.snakeyaml.constructor.Constructor$ConstructYamlObject.construct(Constructor.java:332)
	at org.yaml.snakeyaml.constructor.BaseConstructor.constructObjectNoCheck(BaseConstructor.java:230)
	at org.yaml.snakeyaml.constructor.BaseConstructor.constructObject(BaseConstructor.java:220)
	at org.yaml.snakeyaml.constructor.BaseConstructor.constructDocument(BaseConstructor.java:174)
	at org.yaml.snakeyaml.constructor.BaseConstructor.getSingleData(BaseConstructor.java:158)
	at org.yaml.snakeyaml.Yaml.loadFromReader(Yaml.java:491)
	at org.yaml.snakeyaml.Yaml.load(Yaml.java:416)
	at Main.main(Main.java:37)
Caused by: java.lang.IllegalArgumentException: Can not set java.lang.String field Main$TestDataClass.payload to javax.script.ScriptEngineManager
	at java.base/jdk.internal.reflect.UnsafeFieldAccessorImpl.throwSetIllegalArgumentException(UnsafeFieldAccessorImpl.java:167)
	at java.base/jdk.internal.reflect.UnsafeFieldAccessorImpl.throwSetIllegalArgumentException(UnsafeFieldAccessorImpl.java:171)
	at java.base/jdk.internal.reflect.UnsafeObjectFieldAccessorImpl.set(UnsafeObjectFieldAccessorImpl.java:81)
	at java.base/java.lang.reflect.Field.set(Field.java:780)
	at org.yaml.snakeyaml.introspector.FieldProperty.set(FieldProperty.java:44)
	at org.yaml.snakeyaml.constructor.Constructor$ConstructMapping.constructJavaBean2ndStep(Constructor.java:286)
	... 9 more
[+] Dumping Received HTTP Request. Will not be empty if PoC worked
GET /proof-of-concept HTTP/1.1
User-Agent: Java/11.0.14
Host: localhost:8000
Accept: text/html, image/gif, image/jpeg, *; q=.2, */*; q=.2
Connection: keep-alive
```

### Further Analysis
Potential mitigations include, leveraging SnakeYaml's SafeConstructor while parsing untrusted content.

See https://bitbucket.org/snakeyaml/snakeyaml/issues/561/cve-2022-1471-vulnerability-in#comment-64581479 for discussion on the subject.

### Timeline
**Date reported**: 4/11/2022
**Date fixed**:  [30/12/2022](https://bitbucket.org/snakeyaml/snakeyaml/pull-requests/44)
**Date disclosed**: 10/13/2022

snakeYAML before 1.32 vulnerable to Denial of Service due to Out-of-bounds Write
Using snakeYAML to parse untrusted YAML files may be vulnerable to Denial of Service attacks (DoS). If the parser is running on user supplied input, an attacker may supply content that causes the parser to crash by stack-overflow.