Lookup for vulnerable packages by Package URL.
| Purl | pkg:npm/%40grackle-ai/mcp@0.59.1 |
| Type | npm |
| Namespace | @grackle-ai |
| Name | mcp |
| Version | 0.59.1 |
| Qualifiers |
|
| Subpath | |
| Is_vulnerable | true |
| Next_non_vulnerable_version | 0.70.2 |
| Latest_non_vulnerable_version | 0.70.2 |
| Affected_by_vulnerabilities |
| 0 |
| url |
VCID-6wvj-hzcn-gfan |
| vulnerability_id |
VCID-6wvj-hzcn-gfan |
| summary |
@grackle-ai/mcp has a workspace authorization bypass in its knowledge_search MCP tool
### Impact
The `knowledge_search` and `knowledge_get_node` MCP tools are included in `SCOPED_TOOLS` (visible to scoped agents) but their handlers do not receive `authContext` and do not enforce workspace scoping. A scoped agent in Workspace A can supply an arbitrary `workspaceId` parameter to search or retrieve knowledge graph nodes from Workspace B, bypassing workspace isolation boundaries.
This is a **cross-workspace data leakage** vulnerability affecting any deployment where multiple workspaces contain sensitive knowledge graph data and scoped agents are used.
**Affected code:**
- `packages/mcp/src/tools/knowledge.ts:146-169` (knowledge_search handler)
- `packages/mcp/src/tools/knowledge.ts:244-283` (knowledge_get_node handler)
- `packages/mcp/src/tool-scoping.ts:11` (both tools listed in SCOPED_TOOLS)
**Contrast with correct implementation:** `knowledge_create_node` (same file, lines 334-357) properly receives `authContext` and overrides the user-supplied `workspaceId` for scoped callers.
### Design Note
Cross-workspace knowledge sharing is a legitimate future feature — agents working across different repos may need to collaborate and share knowledge. However, this access should be **opt-in with explicit grants**, not an implicit bypass. The immediate fix locks scoped agents to their own workspace. A future design could introduce:
- Workspace-level "share knowledge with" settings
- A `cross_workspace` scope on scoped tokens
- Explicit `workspaceIds` (plural) in the auth context
### Patches
**Fix:** Add `authContext` parameter to `knowledge_search` and `knowledge_get_node` handlers and enforce workspace scoping, matching the pattern in `knowledge_create_node`:
```typescript
const resolvedWorkspaceId =
authContext?.type === "scoped"
? authContext.workspaceId ?? ""
: workspaceId ?? "";
```
When cross-workspace collaboration is designed, this check can be relaxed intentionally with proper access controls.
### Workarounds
Do not use scoped agent tokens in multi-workspace deployments until patched. Alternatively, remove `knowledge_search` and `knowledge_get_node` from the `SCOPED_TOOLS` set in `tool-scoping.ts`.
### References
- CWE-284: Improper Access Control
- File: `packages/mcp/src/tools/knowledge.ts`
- File: `packages/mcp/src/tool-scoping.ts` |
| references |
|
| fixed_packages |
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| aliases |
GHSA-647h-p824-99w7
|
| risk_score |
null |
| exploitability |
null |
| weighted_severity |
null |
| resource_url |
http://public2.vulnerablecode.io/vulnerabilities/VCID-6wvj-hzcn-gfan |
|
|
| Fixing_vulnerabilities |
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| Risk_score | null |
| Resource_url | http://public2.vulnerablecode.io/packages/pkg:npm/%2540grackle-ai/mcp@0.59.1 |