Package Instance

Tornado is vulnerable to DoS due to too many multipart parts
In versions of Tornado prior to 6.5.5, the only limit on the number of parts in `multipart/form-data` is the `max_body_size` setting (default 100MB). Since parsing occurs synchronously on the main thread, this creates the possibility of denial-of-service due to the cost of parsing very large multipart bodies with many parts. 

Tornado 6.5.5 introduces new limits on the size and complexity of multipart bodies, including a default limit of 100 parts per request. These limits are configurable if needed; see `tornado.httputil.ParseMultipartConfig`. It is also now possible to disable `multipart/form-data` parsing entirely if it is not required for the application.

Tornado has an HTTP cookie parsing DoS vulnerability
The algorithm used for parsing HTTP cookies in Tornado versions prior to 6.4.2 sometimes has quadratic complexity, leading to excessive CPU consumption when parsing maliciously-crafted cookie headers. This parsing occurs in the event loop thread and may block the processing of other requests.

See also CVE-2024-7592 for a similar vulnerability in cpython.

Tornado vulnerable to excessive logging caused by malformed multipart form data
### Summary

When Tornado's ``multipart/form-data`` parser encounters certain errors, it logs a warning but continues trying to parse the remainder of the data. This allows remote attackers to generate an extremely high volume of logs, constituting a DoS attack. This DoS is compounded by the fact that the logging subsystem is synchronous.

### Affected versions

All versions of Tornado prior to 6.5 are affected. The vulnerable parser is enabled by default.

### Solution

Upgrade to Tornado version 6.5. In the meantime, risk can be mitigated by blocking `Content-Type: multipart/form-data` in a proxy.

Tornado is vulnerable to DoS due to too many multipart parts
In versions of Tornado prior to 6.5.5, the only limit on the number of parts in `multipart/form-data` is the `max_body_size` setting (default 100MB). Since parsing occurs synchronously on the main thread, this creates the possibility of denial-of-service due to the cost of parsing very large multipart bodies with many parts. 

Tornado 6.5.5 introduces new limits on the size and complexity of multipart bodies, including a default limit of 100 parts per request. These limits are configurable if needed; see `tornado.httputil.ParseMultipartConfig`. It is also now possible to disable `multipart/form-data` parsing entirely if it is not required for the application.