Package Instance

Sync-in Server has Username Enumeration via Timing Attack
### Summary
The `/api/auth/login` endpoint contains a logic flaw that allows unauthenticated remote attackers to enumerate valid usernames by measuring the application's response time.

### Details
The logic flaw can be located at the below point in source:
https://github.com/Sync-in/server/blob/7868bb2b3025f92e6c38087456304758713971b2/backend/src/applications/users/services/users-queries.service.ts#L91-L95

Endpoints used for authentication should respond to the user with a consistent cadence, preventing remote actors from deriving sensitive information about an application based on backend behavior. In the case of authentication endpoints, this timing discrepancy is often caused by short-circuiting due to the lack of a matched user to compare against - as is the case with Sync-in.

### Validation
TickTock Enum (Burp Suite Extension) was utilized to validate this finding. Authentication attempts with a valid username see a response from the application at around 350-400ms on average, while invalid usernames are returned at only 95-100ms on average.
<img width="1302" height="284" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/31eeb72a-c3c2-4057-ac69-c0c92f0bbd4e" />

### Impact
An unauthenticated remote attacker can enumerate valid usernames. This significantly weakens the application's security posture by facilitating targeted brute-force attacks, stuffing, social engineering, and a suite of other more targeted attacks.