Package Instance

Rucio has SQL Injection in FilterEngine PostgreSQL Query Builder via DID Search API
### Summary

A SQL injection vulnerability in `FilterEngine.create_postgres_query` allows any authenticated Rucio user to execute arbitrary SQL against the configured PostgreSQL metadata database through the DID search endpoint (`GET /dids/<scope>/dids/search`). When the external metadata plugin `postgres_meta` is configured, attacker-controlled filter keys and values are interpolated directly into raw SQL statements via Python `str.format`. This enables full database compromise including data exfiltration, data modification, and potential remote code execution via `COPY ... FROM PROGRAM`.

### Details

*Will follow in two weeks (2025-05-19).*

### Impact

**Vulnerability type:** SQL Injection (CWE-89)

**Who is impacted:**

- Rucio deployments that have explicitly configured the `postgres_meta` metadata plugin.

**What an attacker can do:**

- **Data modification:** PostgreSQL stacked queries enable arbitrary `INSERT`/`UPDATE`/`DELETE` operations.
- **Remote code execution:** Via PostgreSQL's `COPY ... FROM PROGRAM` if the database user has superuser or `pg_execute_server_program` privileges.
- **File system access:** Via `COPY ... TO/FROM '/path'` if filesystem permissions allow.

**Further elevation when the same postgres database and access is used for metadata and for Rucio itself**

- **Full database read access:** Extract any table including `identities` (password hashes and salts), `tokens` (active authentication sessions), `accounts` (user enumeration), `rse_settings` (storage endpoint credentials), and `rules` (data management policies) could be extracted.
- **Password hash extraction:** Combined with Rucio's use of single-iteration SHA-256 for password hashing (no KDF), extracted hashes can be cracked at GPU speed.
- **Authentication token theft:** Active bearer tokens can be extracted and used for immediate session hijacking.

**Required attacker privileges:** Any authenticated Rucio user. Authentication tokens can be obtained via any supported method (userpass, x509, OIDC, SAML, SSH, GSS). No special roles or administrative permissions are required. The `GET /dids/<scope>/dids/search` endpoint is available to all authenticated users.

Rucio has SQL Injection in FilterEngine Oracle JSON Path via DID Search API
### Summary

A SQL injection vulnerability in the Oracle path of `FilterEngine.create_sqla_query` allows any authenticated Rucio user to execute arbitrary SQL against the backend database through the DID search endpoint (`GET /dids/<scope>/dids/search`). Attacker-controlled filter keys and values are interpolated directly into `sqlalchemy.text` via Python `str.format`, completely bypassing parameterization. This enables full database compromise including extraction of authentication tokens, password hashes, and all managed data identifiers. The vulnerability is affecting deployments using the default metadata plugin configuration `json_meta` with Oracle database backends.

### Details

*Will follow in two weeks (2025-05-19).*

### Impact

**Vulnerability type:** SQL Injection (CWE-89)

**Who is impacted:**

- **All Oracle-based Rucio deployments** using the default metadata plugin configuration (`json_meta`).
- ***Not affected*** are PostgreSQL/MySQL deployments using the default `json_meta` plugin (SQLAlchemy parameterizes the JSON path operations via bind parameters on non-Oracle dialects).

**What an attacker can do:**

- **Full database read access:** Extract any table including `identities` (password hashes and salts), `tokens` (active authentication sessions), `accounts` (user enumeration), `rse_settings` (storage endpoint credentials), and `rules` (data management policies).
- **Password hash extraction:** Combined with Rucio's use of single-iteration SHA-256 for password hashing (no KDF), extracted hashes can be cracked at GPU speed.
- **Authentication token theft:** Active bearer tokens can be extracted and used for immediate session hijacking.
- **Data modification:** Oracle PL/SQL enables `INSERT`/`UPDATE`/`DELETE` operations via DML within subqueries and PL/SQL blocks.
- **Potential remote code execution:** Via Oracle's `UTL_HTTP`, `DBMS_SCHEDULER`, or Java stored procedures if the database user has elevated privileges.

**Required attacker privileges:** Any authenticated Rucio user. Authentication tokens can be obtained via any supported method (userpass, x509, OIDC, SAML, SSH, GSS). No special roles or administrative permissions are required. The `GET /dids/<scope>/dids/search` endpoint is available to all authenticated users.