Package Instance

ImageMagick's failure to limit the depth of SVG file reads caused a DoS attack
Using Magick to read a malicious SVG file resulted in a DoS attack.

ImageMagick has a heap-buffer-overflow
### Summary
While Processing a crafted TIFF file, imagemagick crashes.

### Details
Following is the imagemagick version:
```
imagemagick_git/build_26jun23/bin/magick --version
Version: ImageMagick 7.1.1-13 (Beta) Q16-HDRI x86_64 56f478940:20230625 https://imagemagick.org
Copyright: (C) 1999 ImageMagick Studio LLC
License: https://imagemagick.org/script/license.php
Features: Cipher DPC HDRI 
Delegates (built-in): fontconfig freetype jbig jng jpeg lcms lzma pangocairo png tiff webp x xml zlib
Compiler: gcc (4.2)
```
### PoC
issue can be replicated with following command with provided POC file(sent over email):
```bash
magick poc.tiff /dev/null
```
### Impact
This can lead to application crash.

### Credits
Please give credits to Hardik shah of Vehere (Dawn Treaders team)

ImageMagick's failure to limit MVG mutual causes Stack Overflow
Magick fails to check for circular references between two MVGs, leading to a stack overflow.

ImageMagick is vulnerable to an integer Overflow in TIM decoder leading to out of bounds read (32-bit only)
The TIM (PSX TIM) image parser in ImageMagick contains a critical integer overflow vulnerability in the `ReadTIMImage` function (`coders/tim.c`). The code reads `width` and `height` (16-bit values) from the file header and calculates `image_size = 2 * width * height` without checking for overflow.
On 32-bit systems (or where `size_t` is 32-bit), this calculation can overflow if `width` and `height` are large (e.g., 65535), wrapping around to a small value. This results in a small heap allocation via `AcquireQuantumMemory` and later operations relying on the dimensions can trigger an out of bounds read.