Package Instance

Indico vulnerability allows attackers to bulk dump user details
An endpoint used to display details of users listed in certain fields (such as ACLs) could be misused to dump basic user details (such as name, affiliation and email) in bulk.

Indico Insecure Access
A Broken Object Level Authorization (BOLA) vulnerability in Indico v3.2.9 allows attackers to access sensitive information via sending a crafted POST request to the component /api/principals.

Indico may disclose unauthorized user details access via legacy API
A legacy API to retrieve user details could be misused to retrieve profile details of other users without having admin permissions due to a broken access check.

Indico has Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in multiple places
Indico makes outgoing requests to user-provides URLs in various places. This is mostly intentional and part of Indico's functionality, but of course it is never intended to let you access "special" targets such as localhost or cloud metadata endpoints.

Indico discloses local files resulting in Remote Code Execution through LaTeX injection
> [!NOTE]
> If server-side LaTeX rendering is not in use (ie `XELATEX_PATH` was not set in `indico.conf`), this vulnerability does not apply.

### Impact
Due to vulnerabilities in TeXLive and obscure LaTeX syntax that allowed circumventing Indico's LaTeX sanitizer, it is possible to use specially-crafted LaTeX snippets which can read local files or execute code with the privileges of the user running Indico on the server.

### Patches
It is recommended to update to [Indico 3.3.12](https://github.com/indico/indico/releases/tag/v3.3.12) as soon as possible.
See [the docs](https://docs.getindico.io/en/stable/installation/upgrade/) for instructions on how to update.

It is also strongly recommended to enable the containerized LaTeX renderer (using `podman`), which isolates it from the rest of the system. See [the docs](https://docs.getindico.io/en/stable/installation/upgrade/#upgrading-to-3-3-12) for details - it is very easy and from now on the only recommended/supported way of using LaTeX.

### Workarounds
Remove the `XELATEX_PATH` setting from `indico.conf` (or comment it out or set it to `None`) and restart the `indico-uwsgi` and `indico-celery` services to disable LaTeX functionality.

### For more information
For any questions or comments about this advisory:

- Open a thread in [the forum](https://talk.getindico.io/)
- Send an email to [indico-team@cern.ch](mailto:indico-team@cern.ch)

Indico has a missing access check in the event series management API
The API endpoint used to manage event series is missing an access check, allowing unauthenticated/unauthorized access to this endpoint.

The impact of this is limited to:

- Getting the metadata (title, category chain, start/end date) for events in an existing series
- Deleting an existing event series: This just removes the series metadata, ie (if enabled) the links between events in the same series and the lecture series number in the event title
- Modifying an existing event series: Just like for deleting, it would only allow to toggle the metadata display. It could also be used to set an event title pattern for the series, but this is only used when cloning an event from that series.

That this vulnerability does NOT allow unauthorized access to events (beyond the basic metadata mentioned above), nor any kind of tampering with user-visible data in events.

Indico vulnerable to Cross-Site Scripting via LaTeX math code
There is a Cross-Site-Scripting vulnerability when rendering LaTeX math code in contribution or abstract descriptions.

Indico Affected by Cross-Site-Scripting via material uploads
There is a Cross-Site-Scripting vulnerability when uploading certain file types as materials.