Package Instance

BentoML Vulnerable to Arbitrary File Write via Symlink Path Traversal in Tar Extraction
The `safe_extract_tarfile()` function validates that each tar member's path is within the destination directory, but for symlink members it only validates the symlink's own path, **not the symlink's target**. An attacker can create a malicious bento/model tar file containing a symlink pointing outside the extraction directory, followed by a regular file that writes through the symlink, achieving arbitrary file write on the host filesystem.

Insecure deserialization in BentoML
An insecure deserialization vulnerability exists in the BentoML framework, allowing remote code execution (RCE) by sending a specially crafted POST request. By exploiting this vulnerability, attackers can execute arbitrary commands on the server hosting the BentoML application. The vulnerability is triggered when a serialized object, crafted to execute OS commands upon deserialization, is sent to any valid BentoML endpoint. This issue poses a significant security risk, enabling attackers to compromise the server and potentially gain unauthorized access or control.

BentoML has a Path Traversal via Bentofile Configuration
BentoML's `bentofile.yaml` configuration allows path traversal attacks through multiple file path fields (`description`, `docker.setup_script`, `docker.dockerfile_template`, `conda.environment_yml`). An attacker can craft a malicious bentofile that, when built by a victim, exfiltrates arbitrary files from the filesystem into the bento archive. This enables supply chain attacks where sensitive files (SSH keys, credentials, environment variables) are silently embedded in bentos and exposed when pushed to registries or deployed.