Package Instance

Cross-site Scripting
By default, Apache CXF creates a `/services` page containing a listing of the available endpoint names and addresses. This webpage is vulnerable to a reflected Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attack via the `styleSheetPath`, which allows a malicious actor to inject javascript into the web page.

Uncontrolled Resource Consumption
CXF supports (via `JwtRequestCodeFilter`) passing OAuth 2 parameters via a JWT token as opposed to query parameters (see: The OAuth Authorization Framework: JWT Secured Authorization Request (JAR)). Instead of sending a JWT token as a `request` parameter, the spec also supports specifying a URI from which to retrieve a JWT token from via the `request_uri` parameter. CXF was not validating the `request_uri` parameter (apart from ensuring it uses https) and was making a REST request to the parameter in the request to retrieve a token. This means that CXF was vulnerable to DDos attacks on the authorization server, as specified in section of the spec.

Improper Handling of Exceptional Conditions
It is possible to configure Apache CXF to use the `com.sun.net.ssl` implementation via `System.setProperty`. When this system property is set, CXF uses some reflection to try to make the `HostnameVerifier` work with the old `com.sun.net.ssl.HostnameVerifier` interface. However, the default `HostnameVerifier` implementation in CXF does not implement the method in this interface, and an exception is thrown. However, in Apache CXF prior the exception is caught in the reflection code and not properly propagated. What this means is that if you are using the `com.sun.net.ssl` stack with CXF, an error with TLS hostname verification will not be thrown, leaving a CXF client subject to man-in-the-middle attacks.