Package Instance

Sylius has a DQL Injection via API Order Filters
Sylius API filters `ProductPriceOrderFilter` and `TranslationOrderNameAndLocaleFilter` pass user-supplied order direction values directly to Doctrine's `orderBy()` without validation. An attacker can inject arbitrary DQL:

```
GET /api/v2/shop/products?order[price]=ASC,%20variant.code%20DESC
```

Sylius has an Open Redirect via Referer Header
`CurrencySwitchController::switchAction()`, `ImpersonateUserController::impersonateAction()` and `StorageBasedLocaleSwitcher::handle()` use the HTTP Referer header directly when redirecting.

The attack requires the victim to click a legitimate application link placed on an attacker-controlled page. The browser automatically sends the attacker's site as the Referer, and the application redirects back to it. This can be used for phishing or credential theft, as the redirect originates from a trusted domain.

The severity varies by endpoint; public endpoints require no authentication and are trivially exploitable, while admin-only endpoints require an authenticated session but remain vulnerable if an admin follows a link from an external source such as email or chat.

Affected classes:
- `CurrencySwitchController::switchAction()` - public
- `StorageBasedLocaleSwitcher::handle()` - public, used in locale switching without having locale in the `url`
- `ImpersonateUserController::impersonateAction()` - admin-only

Sylius has a Promotion Usage Limit Bypass via Race Condition
A Time-of-Check To Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) race condition was discovered in the promotion usage limit enforcement. The same class of vulnerability affects three independent limits:

1. **Promotion usage limit** - the global `used` counter on `Promotion` entities
2. **Coupon usage limit** - the global `used` counter on `PromotionCoupon` entities
3. **Coupon per-customer usage limit** - the per-customer redemption count on `PromotionCoupon` entities

In all three cases, the eligibility check reads the `used` counter (or order count) from an in-memory Doctrine entity during validation, while the actual usage increment in `OrderPromotionsUsageModifier` happens later during order completion — with no database-level locking or atomic operations between the two phases.

Because Doctrine flushes an absolute value (`SET used = 1`) rather than an atomic increment (`SET used = used + 1`), and because the affected entities lack optimistic locking, concurrent requests all read the same stale usage counts and pass the eligibility checks simultaneously.

An attacker can exploit this by preparing multiple carts with the same limited-use promotion or coupon and firing simultaneous `PATCH /api/v2/shop/orders/{token}/complete` requests. All requests pass the usage limit checks and complete successfully, allowing a single-use promotion or coupon to be redeemed an arbitrary number of times. The per-customer limit can be bypassed in the same way by a single customer completing multiple orders concurrently. No authentication is required to exploit this vulnerability.

This may lead to direct financial loss through unlimited redemption of limited-use promotions and discount coupons.