Package Instance

Electron: HTTP Response Header Injection in custom protocol handlers and webRequest
### Impact
Apps that register custom protocol handlers via `protocol.handle()` / `protocol.registerSchemesAsPrivileged()` or modify response headers via `webRequest.onHeadersReceived` may be vulnerable to HTTP response header injection if attacker-controlled input is reflected into a response header name or value.

An attacker who can influence a header value may be able to inject additional response headers, affecting cookies, content security policy, or cross-origin access controls.

Apps that do not reflect external input into response headers are not affected.

### Workarounds
Validate or sanitize any untrusted input before including it in a response header name or value.

### Fixed Versions
* `41.0.3`
* `40.8.3`
* `39.8.3`
* `38.8.6`

### For more information
If there are any questions or comments about this advisory, send an email to [security@electronjs.org](mailto:security@electronjs.org)

Electron: Registry key path injection in app.setAsDefaultProtocolClient on Windows
### Impact
On Windows, `app.setAsDefaultProtocolClient(protocol)` did not validate the protocol name before writing to the registry. Apps that pass untrusted input as the protocol name may allow an attacker to write to arbitrary subkeys under `HKCU\Software\Classes\`, potentially hijacking existing protocol handlers.

Apps are only affected if they call `app.setAsDefaultProtocolClient()` with a protocol name derived from external or untrusted input. Apps that use a hardcoded protocol name are not affected.

### Workarounds
Validate the protocol name matches `/^[a-zA-Z][a-zA-Z0-9+.-]*$/` before passing it to `app.setAsDefaultProtocolClient()`.

### Fixed Versions
* `41.0.0`
* `40.8.1`
* `39.8.1`
* `38.8.6`

### For more information
If there are any questions or comments about this advisory, please email [security@electronjs.org](mailto:security@electronjs.org)

Electron: nodeIntegrationInWorker not correctly scoped in shared renderer processes
### Impact
The `nodeIntegrationInWorker` webPreference was not correctly scoped in all configurations. In certain process-sharing scenarios, workers spawned in frames configured with `nodeIntegrationInWorker: false` could still receive Node.js integration.

Apps are only affected if they enable `nodeIntegrationInWorker`. Apps that do not use `nodeIntegrationInWorker` are not affected.

### Workarounds
Avoid enabling `nodeIntegrationInWorker` in apps that also open child windows or embed content with differing webPreferences.

### Fixed Versions
* `41.0.0`
* `40.8.4`
* `39.8.4`
* `38.8.6`

### For more information
If there are any questions or comments about this advisory, please email [security@electronjs.org](mailto:security@electronjs.org)

Electron: Service worker can spoof executeJavaScript IPC replies
### Impact
A service worker running in a session could spoof reply messages on the internal IPC channel used by `webContents.executeJavaScript()` and related methods, causing the main-process promise to resolve with attacker-controlled data.

Apps are only affected if they have service workers registered and use the result of `webContents.executeJavaScript()` (or `webFrameMain.executeJavaScript()`) in security-sensitive decisions.

### Workarounds
Do not trust the return value of `webContents.executeJavaScript()` for security decisions. Use dedicated, validated IPC channels for security-relevant communication with renderers.

### Fixed Versions
* `41.0.0`
* `40.8.1`
* `39.8.1`
* `38.8.6`

### For more information
If there are any questions or comments about this advisory, please email [security@electronjs.org](mailto:security@electronjs.org)

Electron: Incorrect origin passed to permission request handler for iframe requests
### Impact
When an iframe requests `fullscreen`, `pointerLock`, `keyboardLock`, `openExternal`, or `media` permissions, the origin passed to `session.setPermissionRequestHandler()` was the top-level page's origin rather than the requesting iframe's origin. Apps that grant permissions based on the origin parameter or `webContents.getURL()` may inadvertently grant permissions to embedded third-party content.

The correct requesting URL remains available via `details.requestingUrl`. Apps that already check `details.requestingUrl` are not affected.

### Workarounds
In your `setPermissionRequestHandler`, inspect `details.requestingUrl` rather than the origin parameter or `webContents.getURL()` when deciding whether to grant `fullscreen`, `pointerLock`, `keyboardLock`, `openExternal`, or `media` permissions.

### Fixed Versions
* `41.0.0`
* `40.8.1`
* `39.8.1`
* `38.8.6`

### For more information
If there are any questions or comments about this advisory, please email [security@electronjs.org](mailto:security@electronjs.org)

Electron: Use-after-free in offscreen child window paint callback
### Impact
Apps that use offscreen rendering and allow child windows via `window.open()` may be vulnerable to a use-after-free. If the parent offscreen `WebContents` is destroyed while a child window remains open, subsequent paint frames on the child dereference freed memory, which may lead to a crash or memory corruption.

Apps are only affected if they use offscreen rendering (`webPreferences.offscreen: true`) and their `setWindowOpenHandler` permits child windows. Apps that do not use offscreen rendering, or that deny child windows, are not affected.

### Workarounds
Deny child window creation from offscreen renderers in your `setWindowOpenHandler`, or ensure child windows are closed before the parent is destroyed.

### Fixed Versions
* `41.0.0`
* `40.7.0`
* `39.8.1`

### For more information
If there are any questions or comments about this advisory, please email [security@electronjs.org](mailto:security@electronjs.org)

Electron: Out-of-bounds read in second-instance IPC on macOS and Linux
### Impact
On macOS and Linux, apps that call `app.requestSingleInstanceLock()` were vulnerable to an out-of-bounds heap read when parsing a crafted second-instance message. Leaked memory could be delivered to the app's `second-instance` event handler.

This issue is limited to processes running as the same user as the Electron app.

Apps that do not call `app.requestSingleInstanceLock()` are not affected. Windows is not affected by this issue.

### Workarounds
There are no app side workarounds, developers must update to a patched version of Electron.

### Fixed Versions
* `41.0.0`
* `40.8.1`
* `39.8.1`
* `38.8.6`

### For more information
If there are any questions or comments about this advisory, please email [security@electronjs.org](mailto:security@electronjs.org)